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INTENT IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
Patrick R. Goold* 
In An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, Professor Vishnubhakat 
makes two arguments. First, that liability for patent infringement should 
only be imposed upon defendants who intentionally make, use, or sell, 
patented inventions. And second, that if patent infringement includes 
such an intent requirement, it would no longer be a strict liability tort. 
This response agrees with the first thesis: patent infringement should 
require intentional conduct of a certain sort. However, the response 
disagrees with the second thesis: even if patent infringement requires 
such intent, liability would, in my view, still be “strict.” 
I.  INTENT 
The Patent Act grants a patent holder the exclusive right to make, use, 
and sell its patented invention.1 Making, using, or selling a patented 
invention without the permission of the patent holder is a tort, i.e. a civil 
wrong for which the patent holder can claim a remedy.2 Professor 
Vishnubhakat’s first claim is that this tort should be an “intentional tort.”3 
Professor Vishnubhakat argues that courts ought to impose liability only 
upon defendants who intentionally make, use, or sell patented 
inventions.4 For example, imagine a pharmaceutical company, Pharma 
Inc., is trying to produce chemical A, but in the course of making that 
substance, the company unwittingly sets off a reaction that produces 
chemical B, for which a patent is held by another company. Professor 
Vishnubhakat argues that Pharma Inc. should not be held liable for 
infringing the patent on chemical B because it lacked the relevant intent: 
while it clearly produced the patented chemical, it did not intend to do 
so.5 Note, Professor Vishnubhakat is not arguing that intent to infringe a 
patent should be a necessary condition for liability. He is not saying that 
Pharma Inc. was unaware of the patent and therefore ought not to be held 
liable. His argument is that the company did not intend to use the thing 
that is subject to the other company’s patent and for that reason, should 
                                                                                                                     
 * Qualcomm Postdoctoral Fellow in Private Law and Intellectual Property, Harvard Law 
School. The author thanks John C.P. Goldberg and Henry E. Smith for their comments on this 
response.  
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 2 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 3.  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. REV. 571, 
610 (2016). 
 4.  Id. at 611–14. 
 5. But note, if after unintentionally making chemical B, Pharma Inc. then decides it could 
use the new substance, it would presumably be liable under Professor Vishnubhakat’s scheme.    
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not be held liable.6 
If patent law were to adopt this intentional conduct requirement, then, 
of course, patent infringement would be an “intentional tort” in line with 
other intentional torts. As defined by courts, “intentional” torts generally 
require an intent to produce a certain kind of consequence (rather than a 
mere intent to undertake an action, irrespective of its consequence),7 but 
do not require the defendant to act with an intent to engage in unlawful 
conduct. For example, trespass to land, an intentional tort,8 sets as a 
condition of liability that the defendant intended to enter or occupy the 
land in question. In other words, the defendant must “intend to make 
physical contact with a particular swath of land, and he must succeed in 
making such contact” before a court will find a trespass.9 The cause of 
action does not require, however, that the defendant intend to violate 
another’s property rights. For example, someone who intentionally enters 
land reasonably believing it to be her own property would still be a 
trespasser, although she did not intend a wrong. If patent infringement 
were to require intentional conduct of the sort Professor Vishnubhakat 
has in mind, it would be an intentional tort in the same way that trespass 
to land is an intentional tort.  
Professor Vishnubhakat argues persuasively that patent infringement 
should (and to some extent already does) require such intentional 
conduct.10 Citing corrective justice and civil recourse literature, Professor 
Vishnubhakat argues that a meaningful level of human agency is 
necessary before someone ought to be liable for losses caused to others, 
and this should be true in patent law as much as any other area of tort 
law.11 The Article is most compelling however, when it turns to the 
practical problems that the intent standard would alleviate. Consider, for 
example, the “Makers vs. Sellers vs. Users” problem.12 Imagine that a 
manufacturer produces a new tablet computer that incorporates a patented 
microprocessor without a license. The tablet is then sold by a downstream 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Indeed, even if Pharma Inc. was aware that chemical B was invented, Professor 
Vishnubhakat would presumably argue that the company still should not be liable because it 
nevertheless did not intend to make chemical B.  
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).   
 8. Id. §158. 
 9. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: TORTS 232 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). 
 10. See Vishbnubhakat supra note 3 at 611. Professor Vishnubhakat’s argument is fairly 
described as an interpretive legal theory. His argument is not merely that patent infringement 
should require intent, but that the values underlying patent infringement already require 
infringement to require intent. The intent standard he envisions not only “fits” (broadly) with the 
pre-existing law, but it coheres with the set of principles which “justify” this regulation in the first 
place. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 45–46 (1986) (describing the debate of 
semantic theories of law). 
 11.  See Vishbnubhakat supra note 3 at 590–91. 
 12.  See id. at 611–14. 
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retailer and used by an end-user, both of whom are unaware the tablet 
contains the microprocessor. If patent-infringement liability is imposed 
upon anyone who simply makes, uses, or sells patented invention, then 
the manufacturer, retailer, and end-user are each directly liable (although 
each would pay a different amount in damages). To many patent lawyers, 
this seems simply wrong. Many intuitively see the retailer and end-user 
as insufficiently blameworthy to be held responsible for patent 
infringement in this scenario. If patent law were to adopt an intentional 
conduct requirement, however, then the result would likely be different 
and better fitting with our intuitions. While the manufacturer would be 
liable, the retailer and end-user would likely not, on the grounds they did 
not intend (in the sense used by Professor Vishnubhakat) to sell or use 
the microprocessor. It is pragmatic arguments, such as this one, which 
make Professor Vishnubhakat’s proposal attractive.   
Nevertheless, the argument could benefit from a stronger theoretical 
grounding. An intentional conduct requirement would likely fulfill the 
economic efficiency goal of patent law. As public goods, inventions may 
be under-produced. Patent rights aim to overcome this market failure. 
Users of the invention are expected to negotiate ex ante for permission to 
use the invention. Through bargaining, the benefit produced by the 
invention is internalized to the patent holder, thus creating appropriate 
incentives to invent (the dynamic efficiency rationale). However, such ex 
ante bargaining cannot occur when the user is unaware she is using the 
invention. For example, Pharma Inc. in the example above cannot ex ante 
negotiate for permission to make chemical B because it does not expect 
to create chemical B. In a case like this, private bargaining cannot 
internalize the benefit to the inventor. As a result, society must use 
liability to internalize this benefit. And therein lies the rub: unlike 
bargaining, liability is not cheap. Allowing the patent holder to sue the 
unintentional user for a remedy requires lawyers, evidence, a court to hear 
the claim, and someone to enforce the judgment. The question for policy 
makers is, therefore: Would the benefit of internalization here be greater 
than its costs? To which the answer is: probably not! Professor James 
Bessen and Professor Michael Meurer recently conducted “the first 
comprehensive empirical evaluation of the patent system’s 
performance.”13 The investigation found that the costs of the patent 
system outstripped its benefits, and concluded that the patent system is 
“broken.”14 In particular, the “explosion” in the patent system’s cost was 
due to the high expenditure on patent litigation.15 My hunch is, therefore, 
that in cases of unintentional infringement, the gains of internalization 
                                                                                                                     
 13. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 3 (2008).  
 14. Id. at 5.  
 15. Id. at 24. 
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created by liability will be smaller than the litigation costs such liability 
would create. On the balance of probabilities, it would be a more efficient 
use of resources to withhold liability in cases of unintentional 
infringement. These are cases where, as Oliver Wendell Holmes once 
said, the “loss from accident must lie where it falls.”16 
II.  STRICT LIABILITY 
Adopting an intent-to-produce-the-item-that-infringes requirement is 
a sensible idea. But if this proposal is adopted, would patent infringement 
still be a strict liability tort? Professor Vishnubhakat says no. The 
Article’s second thesis is that if patent infringement is an “intentional 
tort” in the sense that it uses that term, then it must be a form of fault 
liability.17 On this point, I am less convinced. My view is that even if 
intentional conduct is required, liability would still be “strict.” 
Nevertheless, reasonable minds may differ on this point, and there is 
substantial evidence to support Professor Vishnubhakat’s view. 
One might think this question should have an easy answer. In essence, 
the Article argues that patent infringement cases should be governed by 
similar rules as trespass to land cases. Accordingly, if liability in trespass 
is “strict” then so would be patent infringement. But here we run into a 
difficulty: there is no consensus on whether trespass to land is “strict” 
liability or not. Certainly, some cases refer to trespass as a “strict liability 
tort,”18 as do some treatise writers.19 And, on some historical accounts, 
“fault liability” was a nineteenth century innovation that departed from 
strict liability with which “trespass” was synonymous.20 On the other 
hand, this characterization conflicts with the tripartite division of torts. 
Tort lawyers usually divide torts into three mutually exclusive categories: 
intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability.21 The first two categories 
together make up the broader category of “fault liability.”22 But if 
trespass to land is an “intentional tort,” surely that means trespass is fault 
                                                                                                                     
 16. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881). 
 17.  See Vishbnubhakat supra note 3 at 618. 
 18. See, e.g., Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont’l Freight, Inc. 135 F.3d 526, 529 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (“Trespass is a strict liability tort . . . .”). 
 19. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 (2001) (“Since the intent required to 
show a trespass is only an intent to enter land, and since that intent might be wholly innocent, the 
rules may sometimes impose a limited kind of strict liability.”). 
 20. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, 123–143 (1992) (discussing the displacement of strict liability by the negligence standard 
as the norm in American tort law in the mid-nineteenth century). 
21. See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 1061, 1079 (2006). 
 22. See id. 
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liability.23 Following this reasoning, some lawyers do think of trespass as 
requiring “intentional fault.”24 Clearly, therefore, when thinking about 
the liability imposed in cases of patent infringement, looking to trespass 
will not provide any easy answers. The confusion that we find in trespass 
simply is exported to the arena of patents. Answering this question 
requires, therefore, a theory of the distinction between fault and strict 
liability.  
Interestingly, two of the most prominent theories of the strict/fault 
liability divide support Professor Vishnubhakat’s view. The first comes 
from Jules Coleman.25 Coleman argued that strict liability is liability 
imposed when the injurer’s action causes cognizable loss to the victim, 
whereas in fault liability the injurer’s “fault” must cause the loss. Fault 
exists in two cases: first where there is fault in the action (or fault in the 
doing) and second, where there is fault in the actor (or fault in the doer).26 
In the first instance, the fault is failing to conform to a standard society 
expects of the defendant—such as the requirement to take reasonable care 
to prevent harm to others. In the second instance, the fault exists where 
the “conduct exemplifies some shortcoming in [the actor], usually a 
defect in character or motivation.” 27 Coleman suggests that intentional 
conduct is a type of fault in the actor. 28 He writes: “It is not a condition 
of intentional torts that the person intended to do harm or to act 
wrongfully, that is, to act in violation of some rule or standard. Rather, 
someone commits an intentional tort if she intends to perform some act, 
does perform it as a result of her intending to, and the act is wrong under 
some description of it.”29 Under this standard, trespass is, and patent 
infringement would be, fault liability.  
However, I find this argument problematic. While the distinction 
between fault in the actor and fault in the action is helpful, I doubt that 
intentional conduct is truly a fault in the actor. Does liability in trespass 
require some “shortcoming” in character or motivation? I do not think so. 
The desire to walk on a plot of land, or to make a chemical substance, is 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Although, some do suggest the categories are not mutually exclusive, and that one can 
be strictly liable for intentional torts. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981); Keith Hylton, Intent 
in Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1226 (2010) (explaining when intentional torts are strict). 
 24. See generally Allan Beever, The Form of Liability in the Torts of Trespass, 40 COMMON 
L. WORLD REV. 378 (2011) (describing the frequently held belief that trespass requires intentional 
fault). 
 25. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 212–33 (1992). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 217.  
 28. I say “suggest” because Coleman does not say explicitly into which category of fault 
intentional torts fall into. Nevertheless, I read him as saying intentional torts are of the fault in the 
actor type. 
 29. Id. at 218. 
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not, in my mind, a character flaw. I think a character flaw is only 
exhibited when the defendant performs this conduct knowing it to be 
legally wrongful, as in the famous case of Jacque v. Steenberg.30   
A second theory that aids Professor Vishnubhakat is described by 
John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky.31 Goldberg and Zipursky explain 
that, according to “prevailing academic usage, strict liability is liability 
without wrongdoing.”32 Liability is strict when it is imposed upon a 
defendant who causes the plaintiff harm.33 By contrast, fault liability 
requires wrongdoing in the sense that the defendant must fail to comply 
with “an applicable standard of conduct.” 34 Under this theory, trespass 
to land is a type of fault liability.35 The wrongdoing in trespass is the 
invasion of the landowner’s right to exclude others.36 The landowner’s 
entitlement sets a standard of conduct to which others must conform (we 
must keep off the land of others) and failure to meet that standard is a 
form of wrongdoing for which liability will attach.37 Of course, Goldberg 
and Zipursky explain this theory in order to expose its flaws. The ultimate 
purpose of Goldberg and Zipursky’s work is to show that the fault/strict 
liability distinction is a “false dichotomy.”38 As they argue, most cases of 
fault liability, or liability with wrongdoing, is strict in the sense of 
imposing liability in a “demanding or unforgiving manner.”39 Likewise, 
only a very small corner of tort law—liability for abnormally dangerous 
activity—imposes liability without any real wrongdoing.40 Nevertheless, 
the prevailing academic theory they discuss does provide support for 
Professor Vishnubhakat’s view. Much like trespass, the patent holder’s 
exclusive right to use the invention sets a standard of conduct with an 
accompanying legal directive to others (“Don’t use without 
permission!”). Liability for infringement requires wrongdoing in the 
sense that the defendant must violate this exclusive entitlement.  
However, this theory also is problematic for Professor Vishnubhakat’s 
theory. Under this theory, patent infringement is already fault liability, 
regardless of the intentional conduct standard. The patent holder’s 
                                                                                                                     
 30. 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997). 
 31. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the 
Fault in Strict Liability, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2016).  
 32. Id. at 745. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 748. 
 36. Id. (“So long as there has been the requisite invasion, the wrong has been committed”) 
(emphasis added). 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 743. 
 39. Id. at 745. 
40.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2001).  
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exclusive right is to make, use, or sell the invention. One does wrong to 
the patent holder simply by performing one of these acts. It seems to me, 
therefore, that even before we discuss the issue of intent, liability for 
patent infringement must rest on some form of wrongdoing. While 
supporting Professor Vishnubhakat’s view that patent infringement is not 
really strict liability, it negates his argument that intentional conduct is 
what makes patent infringement fault-based.41  
Finally, this is my view: when someone acts contrary to the rights of 
another, they do wrong to that person. It is a sad fact of life that we 
commit such wrongs all the time: we enter their land, we damage their 
chattels when we bump their cars in traffic collisions, and we make false 
statements that harm reputations. When such a wrong occurs, it is the role 
of tort law to determine who, if anyone, should be held responsible.42 In 
particular, when a plaintiff shows a defendant has interfered with her 
rights, the question for tort lawyers is: Should the defendant be held 
responsible for this wrong? As a basic matter, we only hold a defendant 
responsible for a wrong if there was a certain level of human agency 
involved in the wrongdoing. In some cases, such as trespass to land, that 
is all the law requires—we require only that the defendant intentionally 
contacted land in a manner that happens to interfere with rights before 
holding the defendant responsible for the property violation.43 These are 
wrongs for which someone will be held strictly liable. In other cases, 
liability is less strict. Fault liability requires not only that the defendant 
wronged another person as a result of their purposeful action, but that 
they intended that wrong, or at least failed to take reasonable care to 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Elsewhere, while discussing property damage caused by abnormally dangerous 
behavior, Goldberg and Zipursky write that liability does not hinge “merely on injury, but on 
injury that is the realization of misconduct.” Id. at 757 (emphasis added). If we think about this 
statement in the context of trespass, it might lend support for the idea that the invasion of the right 
to exclude is not itself the wrongdoing, but instead the intentional conduct requirement is the 
misconduct which makes liability fault-based. This might provide more support for Professor 
Vishnubhakat’s view that the intentional conduct standard is truly what makes patent infringement 
fault-liability. But I find this problematic for the similar reasons explained in response to 
Coleman’s theory. That is, is intentionally walking on land a form of misconduct? Is there a 
standard of conduct that says “don’t walk on land?” or “don’t use inventions?” Not to my 
knowledge! If the injury or the rights-invasion is therefore not the wrongdoing itself, then I don’t 
see the intentional conduct standard as supplying an adequate alternative.  
 42. Accordingly, I see “torts as wrongs.” See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin 
Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) (arguing that that torts are best understood 
as a law of wrongs and recourse rather than a system for allocating the costs of accidents). But I 
do not see the conceptual core of tort law as defining wrongdoing. I see wrongs-definition as being 
supplied by sources mostly outside of tort law (such as property law, constitutional law, or human 
rights). The unique core of tort law, in my mind, lies in its ability to determine the conditions 
under which someone ought to be responsible for such wrongs.  
43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2001).  
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prevent it. Liability for road traffic accidents or fraudulent 
misrepresentation, for example, is not strictly imposed because it requires 
a lot more than a mere showing that the defendant acted contrary to the 
plaintiff’s rights. 44 
From my perspective, therefore, liability in patent infringement cases 
would still be strict even if patent lawyers unequivocally confirm that 
intentional conduct is necessary. Liability would be strict in the same way 
trespass to land, in my view, is. By contrast, if patent lawyers discard the 
intentional conduct standard, then liability will not be strict, but it will be 
a very unique form of ultra-strict liability which arguably does not 
conform to our usual notions about responsibility. One of the virtues of 
Professor Vishnubhakat’s Article is it exposes how unusually strict patent 




In sum, Professor Vishnubhakat provides a pragmatic and 
normatively attractive proposal to make patent infringement an 
“intentional tort.” However, more drastic reform would be required 
before patent infringement, in my mind, would be a fault-based tort. 
Whether such reforms should be made is a question for another day.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 44.  See 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles § 1044 (2017); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 27 
(2017). 
